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ABSTRACT
Targeted advertising is meant to improve the efficiency of match-
ing advertisers to their customers. However, targeted advertising
can also be abused by malicious advertisers to efficiently reach
people susceptible to false stories, stoke grievances, and incite so-
cial conflict. Since targeted ads are not seen by non-targeted and
non-vulnerable people, malicious ads are likely to go unreported
and their effects undetected. This work examines a specific case
of malicious advertising, exploring the extent to which political
ads 1 from the Russian Intelligence Research Agency (IRA) run
prior to 2016 U.S. elections exploited Facebook’s targeted advertis-
ing infrastructure to efficiently target ads on divisive or polarizing
topics (e.g., immigration, race-based policing) at vulnerable sub-
populations. In particular, we do the following: (a) We conduct
U.S. census-representative surveys to characterize how users with
different political ideologies report, approve, and perceive truth in
the content of the IRA ads. Our surveys show that many ads are
“divisive”: they elicit very different reactions from people belonging
to different socially salient groups. (b) We characterize how these
divisive ads are targeted to sub-populations that feel particularly
aggrieved by the status quo. Our findings support existing calls for
greater transparency of content and targeting of political ads. (c)
We particularly focus on how the Facebook ad API facilitates such
targeting. We show how the enormous amount of personal data
Facebook aggregates about users and makes available to advertisers
enables such malicious targeting.
KEYWORDS
advertisements, targeting, social divisiveness, news media, social
media, perception bias
1We deployed a system that shows the ads and the demographics of their targeting
audiences (available at http://www.socially-divisive-ads.dcc.ufmg.br/ ).
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FAT* ’19, January 29–31, 2019, Atlanta, GA, USA
ACM Reference Format:
Filipe N. Ribeiro*, Koustuv Saha*, Mahmoudreza Babaei, Lucas Henrique,
Johnnatan Messias, Fabricio Benevenuto, Oana Goga, Krishna P. Gummadi,
and Elissa M. Redmiles. 2018. On Microtargeting Socially Divisive Ads:
[0.1em] A Case Study of Russia-Linked Ad Campaigns on Facebook. In
Proceedings of FAT* ’19: Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Trans-
parency (FAT* ’19). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 10 pages. https://doi.org/10.
1145/3287560.3287580
1 INTRODUCTION
Online targeted advertising refers to the ability of an advertiser to
select audience for their ads. Such advertising constitutes the pri-
mary source of revenue for many online sites including most social
media websites such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Pinterest.
Consequently, these websites accumulate detailed demographic,
behavioral and interest profiles of their users enabling advertisers
to “microtarget”, i.e., choose small (tens or hundreds to thousands)
of users with very specific attributes like people living in a zipcode
that read New York Times or Breitbart. Beyond raising numerous
privacy concerns [17, 24], targeted advertising platforms have come
under scrutiny for enabling discriminatory advertising, where ads
announcing housing or job opportunities are targeted to exclude
people belonging to certain races or gender [4, 8, 10, 23].
In this paper, we analyze the potential for a new form of abuse on
targeted advertising platforms namely, socially divisive advertising,
where malicious advertisers incite social conflict by publishing ads
on divisive societal issues of the day (e.g., immigration and racial-
bias in policing in the lead up to 2016 US presidential elections).
Specifically, we focus on how ad targeting on social media sites
such as Facebook can be leveraged to selectively target groups on
different sides of a divisive issue with (potentially false) messages
that are deliberately crafted to stoke their grievances and thereby,
worsen social discord. We also investigate whether targeted ad
platforms allow such malicious campaigns to be carried out in
stealth, by excluding people who are likely to report (i.e., alert site
administrators or media watchdog groups about) such ads.
Our study is based on an in-depth analysis of a publicly released
dataset of Facebook ads run by a Russian agency called Internet
Research Agency (IRA) before and during the American Election on
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the year of 2016 2 3. Our analysis is centered around three high-level
research questions:
RQ 1: How divisive is the content of the IRA ads?We quantify the divi-
siveness of an ad by analyzing the differences in reactions of people
with different ideological persuasions to the ad. Specifically, using
US census-representative surveys, we look at how conservative-
and liberal-minded people differ in (a) how likely they are to re-
port the ad, (b) how strongly they approve or disapprove the ad’s
content, and (c) how they perceive truthood (or falsehood) in ad’s
claims. Our analysis shows that IRA ads elicit starkly different
and polarizing responses from people with different ideological
pursuasions.
RQ 2: How effectively done was the targeting of the socially divisive
ads? We find that the “Click Through Rate” (CTR), a traditional
measure of effectiveness of targeting, of the IRA ads are an order of
magnitude (10 times) higher than that of typical Facebook ads. The
high CTR suggests that the ads have been targeted very efficiently. A
deeper analysis of the demographic biases in the targeted audience
reveals that the ads have been targeted at people who are more
likely to approve the content and perceive fewer false claims, and
are less likely to report.
RQ 3: What features of Facebook’s ad API were leveraged in targeting
the ads?We also analyze the construction or specification of “tar-
geting formulae” for the ads, i.e., the combination of Facebook user
attributes that are used when selecting the audience for the ads.
We find widespread use of interest attributes such as “Black Con-
sciousness movement” and “Chicano movement” that are mostly
shared by people from specific demographic groups such as African-
Americans and Mexican-Americans. We show how Facebook ad
API’s suggestion feature may be exploited by the advertisers to
find interest attributes that correlate very strongly to specific social
demographic groups.
1.1 Related Work
Prior work has highlighted several forms of abuses of targeted
advertising in Facebook, such as for inappropriately exposing the
private information of users to advertisers [24], and for allowing
discriminatory advertising (e.g., to exclude users belonging to a
certain race or gender from receiving their ads) [23]. Our effort
highlights a new and different form of potential abuse of these
targeted advertising platforms in creating a social discord.
A rich body of prior work have focused on understanding filter
bubbles, echo chambers, polarization, and ideological discourse in
social media as an emergent phenomenon [7, 9, 12, 14, 15, 19, 22].
We provide a complementary perspective on the topic by examining
how echo chambers and polarization can be engineered on social
media through targeted advertising. A recent work conducted a
detailed study about Facebook Ads environment by analyzing thou-
sands of ads collected through a browser plugin[2]. More closely
related to our work, Kim et al. gathered Facebook ads from individ-
uals and analyzed who are behind divisive ad campaigns, reporting
suspicious foreign entities [16]. Differently, we focus on understand-
ing the disruptive ability of microtargeting for providing divisive
political ad campaigns.
2www.wsj.com/articles/you-cant-buy-the-presidency-for-100-000-1508104629
3www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/us/politics/ russia-2016-election-facebook.html
Figure 1: Example of an Ad from the Dataset.
Finally, our effort is complementary to prior work that attempts
to understand the abuse of social media by misinformation cam-
paigns, especially along political elections [18, 25]. Our work pro-
vides a better comprehension about a key disseminationmechanism
of fake news stories, highlighting how advertising platforms allow
injection of misinformation in social systems and choose vulnerable
people as the target.
2 RUSSIA-LINKED FACEBOOK ADS DATASET
On May 10th, 2018 the Democrats Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence released a dataset containing 3,517 Facebook adver-
tisements4 from 2015, 2016, and 2017 that are linked to a Russian
propaganda group: Internet Research Agency (IRA).
Each ad is composed of an image and text (Figure 1 shows an
example). Additionally, each ad contains a landing page, which is
a link to the host of the ad, as well as an ad ID; an ad targeting
formula, which is a combination of demographic, behavioral and
user interest aspects used to target Facebook users; the cost for
running the ad in Russia Rubles5; the number of impressions, which
is the number of users who spent some time observing the ad; the
number of clicks received by the ad; and, finally, the ad creation
and end dates. This section provides an overview of these ads.
The ads in the dataset were run between June 2015 and August
2017. From the 3,517 advertisements, we found that 617 (17.5%)
were created in 2015, 1,867 (53.1%) in 2016, and 1,033 (29.4%) in
2017. Figure 2 shows the distribution of these ads over time in terms
of the number of ads created per month, cost to run the ads, and
impressions and clicks received. Note that the y-axis is in log scale.
We observed that the number of impressions, and clicks, increases
almost an order of magnitude around the election period (shaded
region). There is also another peak in February, just after the newly
elected U.S. President Donald Trump assumed office.
4democrats-intelligence.house.gov/ facebook-ads/ social-media-advertisements.htm
5We converted currency of the costs to USD as of May 15th, 1 USD = 61.33 RUB.
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Figure 2: Number of ads created, their impressions, cost, and
received clicks over time. Shaded region shows the 2-month
period just before the 2016 U.S. Election.
Figure 3: Top 10 Landing Pages based on the number of ads.
2.1 Landing Pages
We first explore the ad landing pages: the urls to which users who
clicked on the ads were redirected. There are 462 unique land-
ing pages corresponding to all the ads. Figure 3 shows the top
10 landing pages per number of ads posted. The most popular
landing page (fb.com/Black-Matters-1579673598947501/ ) posted 259
advertisements. Interestingly, one of the top landing pages, the
musicfb.info6, invites users to install a browser extension, which
was reported to send spam to the Facebook friends of those who
installed it7. This landing page received 24,623 impressions, 85
clicks, and spent around US$112.38. The domain musicfb.info was
also promoted by other pages, accounting for 3% of all ads. We
also find that the most popular landing pages are Facebook pages,
accounting for 84% of all ads, followed by blackmattersus.com (7%),
and Instagram (3.4%). For 28 ads, we were not able to identify their
landing pages because these pages were already blocked.
2.2 Cost, Impressions, Clicks and CTR
Figure 4 (a) shows the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of
all the ads in the dataset on their number of impressions, clicks,
and amount spent to advertise. The most expensive ad cost 5,307 $
6web.archive.org/web/20161019155736/musicfb.info/
7wired.com/story/ russia-facebook-ads-sketchy-chrome-extension/
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the ads
on their (a) clicks, impressions, and costs, (b) click-through-
rates.
USD. The highest number of impressions generated was 1,335,000
and the maximum number of clicks was 73,060.
Nearly 25% of the landing pages spent more than 100 dollars,
26.8% of the pages received more than 1,000 clicks, and around
36.1% had more than 10, 000 impressions. On the other hand, more
than 25% of the ads had no impressions, clicks, and cost, suggesting
these ads were not launched or ran for a very short period of time.
An average ad cost 34.5 USD, was seen by 11,536 users, and
received 1,062 clicks. The average value is increased to 38 USD for
cost, 16,482 for impressions, and 1,521 for the number of clicks if we
exclude those ads that appeared not to have been run. The Pearson’s
correlation coefficient among cost, impressions, and clicks is very
high, particularly between impressions and clicks (0.89). We also
noted that this dataset is quite skewed, as 10% of the ads accumulate
85.18% of the total cost, 71.93% of the total number of impressions,
69.47% of the total number of clicks.
However, therewere notable exceptions to this correlation: higher
investment (cost) did not always lead to higher return (e.g., im-
pressions, clicks). Table 1 shows the most popular landing pages
per impressions, clicks, and cost of the ads. For example, fb.com/
brownunitedfront/, received the largest number of impressions
(5,817,734), corresponding alone to 14.3% of impressions obtained
by all ads, but cost only 6.5% of the total cost of all ads in the dataset.
Finally, we compute the click-through rate (CTR) of these ads,
which is a typical metric to measure the effectiveness of an ad.
It is computed as a ratio between the number of clicks and the
number of impressions received by an ad. Figure 4 (right) shows the
cumulative distribution function of the CTR of the ads, excluding
those with 0 values for clicks, impressions, and cost. The median
CTR is 10.8% and 75% of the ads have a CTR higher than 5.6. The
average CTR is 10.8%. These are incredibly high values for CTR.
As a comparison, WordStream released a report as of April 20188
which shows the average CTR for Facebook ads across all industries
is 0.9%. As an example, Retail is 1.6%, Fitness is 1%, Health care
0.8%, and Finance is 0.56%. This means that these political ads have
a CTR that is about an order of magnitude higher than a typical
Facebook ad.
8wordstream.com/blog/ws/2017/02/28/ facebook-advertising-benchmarks
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Impressions Clicks Cost (USD)
fb.com/brownunitedfront/ 14.3% fb.com/brownunitedfront/ 18.8% fb.com/patriototus/ 6.5%
fb.com/blacktivists/ 10.8% fb.com/Blacktivist-128371547505950/ 13.8% fb.com/blacktivists/ 5.4%
fb.com/Blacktivist-128371547505950/ 10.5% fb.com/blacktivists/ 11.9% fb.com/blackmattersus/ 5.3%
fb.com/blackmattersus.mvmnt/ 4.7% fb.com/blackmattersus.mvmnt/ 7.0% fb.com/timetosecede/ 4.7%
fb.com/Woke-Blacks-294234600956431/ 3.3% fb.com/Dont-Shoot-1157233400960126/ 3.6% fb.com/Igbtun/ 4.3%
fb.com/copsareheroes/ 3.3% fb.com/blackmattersus/ 2.5% fb.com/BlackJourney2Justice/ 4.1%
fb.com/blackmattersus/ 3.1% fb.com/patriototus/ 2.5% fb.com/MuslimAmerica/ 3.28
fb.com/South-United-1777037362551238/ 2.7% fb.com/Memopolis-450474615151098/ 2.4% fb.com/South-United-1777037362551238/ 3.2%
fb.com/Dont-Shoot-1157233400960126/ 2.2% fb.com/Woke-Blacks-294234600956431/ 2.3% fb.com/blackmattersus.mvmnt/ 2.7%
fb.com/patriototus/ 1.7% fb.com/South-United-1777037362551238/ 2.0% fb.com/savethe2a/ 2.5%
Table 1: Most popular landing pages per impressions, clicks, and cost.
2.3 High Impact Ads
Our analysis reveals that only a few ads are responsible for most
of the cost, impressions, and clicks. Considering this, we defined a
set of high impact ads as the union of the top 10% ads in terms of
cost, impressions, clicks, and CTR. We obtained 905 high impact
ads, corresponding to 27.7% of the entire dataset. These ads account
together to 83.9% of the total number of impressions, 81.8% of clicks,
88.5% of the cost, and 46.9% of the CTR. For the purposes of our
study, where we require manual inspection of the ads (to identify
their targets and to run surveys), our ensuing analyses concern
those high impact ads run before the 2016 U.S. elections: 485 ads.
2.4 Summary
This section describes and characterizes the ads in the IRA dataset.
Our analysis highlights the landing pages that paid for the ads and
identifies the most successful ads in terms of impressions and clicks.
We find that the ad campaigns were intensified near to the U.S.
election period. Among our main findings, we show that the typical
CTR for these ads is an order of magnitude higher than typical
values for Facebook, meaning that these ads were very effective.
3 ANALYZING DIVISIVENESS OF THE ADS
To investigate whether these ads were designed to be ideologically
divisive – that is, designed to elicit different reactions from people
with different political viewpoints – we conducted three online
surveys on a U.S. census-representative sample (n=2,886). We used
each survey to measure one of three axes along which ads could
potentially be divisive: 1) reporting: whether respondents would
report the ads, and why, 2) approval and disapproval: whether they
approve or disapprove the content of the ad, and 3) false claims: if
they are able to identify any false claims in the content of the ad.
Our surveys considered only those 485 high impact ads which
were run before the elections. Each survey showed ten ads followed
by demographic questions. More detail on the specific questions
used to assess each axis is provided in the corresponding axis sub-
sections that follow. The survey questions were pre-tested using
cognitive interviews and all survey questions included a “I don’t
know” or “Prefer not to respond” answer choice to ensure internal
measurement validity [6]. To obtain a demographically representa-
tive sample, and ensure that we captured a wide variety of American
perceptions, we deployed the surveys using the Survey Sampling In-
ternational survey panel9, a non-probabilistic census-representative
survey panel. For each survey, we sampled at least 730 respondents
(15 responses per ad) whose demographics were representative of
the U.S. within 5% and who had a range of political views (40%
liberal, 40% conservative, and 20% moderate or neutral); across the
three surveys we obtained a total sample of 2,886 respondents.
We measured overall ideological divisiveness on the three axes
(reporting, approval, and false claims) using two metrics:
Within-group divisiveness.Within-group divisiveness measures
the extent to which respondents’ answers about a particular ad are
consistent with their political ideology. That is, do all liberals answer
similarly about a particular ad. For each ad, we first calculate the
standard deviation of all the responses, and then we calculate the
standard deviation of the responses within a particular ideological
group. Next, we compute within-group divisiveness as the fraction
of within-group standard deviation to the overall standard deviation.
Therefore we interpret values lower than 1 as lower divisiveness
(and greater agreeableness) within a group than overall, and values
greater than 1 as greater within-group divisiveness than overall.
Between-group divisiveness. Between-group divisiveness mea-
sures the extent to which answers from respondents of one political
ideology differ from answers of respondents who align with another
political ideology. That is, do liberals answer differently about a
particular ad than conservatives. For an ad, we calculate the differ-
ence between the mean responses per ideological group, and then
compute the fraction of this difference over the maximum possible
difference given the range of values to obtain the between-group
divisiveness measure. This limits the range of between-group divi-
siveness measure between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate
greater divisiveness between ideological groups.
Table 2 summarizes the divisiveness of the high impact ads. We
find that the within-group divisiveness measure is lower than 1
for all our surveys. This indicates high agreeableness within the
ideological groups. In addition, about 20% of the ads show between-
group divisiveness higher than 0.5, indicating severe divisiveness
between ideological groups for those ads.
3.1 Likelihood of reporting the ads
The first axis of divisiveness that we explored was reporting. We
surveyed respondents regarding: 1) Whether they would report
9https://www.surveysampling.com/audiences/consumer-online/
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Measure (Group) Reporting Approval False Claims
Mean Stdev. Mean Stdev. Mean Stdev.
Within-group divisiveness
Liberals 0.87 0.47 0.92 0.36 0.66 0.69
Conservatives 0.90 0.43 0.98 0.31 0.86 0.63
Between-group divisiveness
Political 0.24 0.18 0.34 0.24 0.17 0.14
Table 2: Divisiveness measures of the high impact ads.
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Figure 5: Distribution of the high impact ads on the (a) pro-
portion of reported ads in our dataset, (b) reasons of inap-
propriateness.
the ad shown?10, and 2) If they would, why do they find the ad
inappropriate? Answer choices given, drawn directly from Face-
book’s reporting interface [11], were: sexually inappropriate, violent,
offensive, misleading, disagree, false news, spam, and something else.
Figure 5 shows the reporting responses for the high impact IRA
ads. For over 73% of these ads, at least 20% of the respondents
responded that they would have reported the ads. We observe that
the majority of the ads were reported on the grounds of being
offensive (25%), violent (15%), and misleading (15%). Additionally, a
substantial proportion (9%) of the reported responses belonged to
the something else category. In such cases, the respondents entered
free-text to explain their reason for inappropriateness. Out of the 61
responses that we received in the free-text box, the pre-dominant
reasons were that the ad incites racism (20%), and that the ad creates
divide (5%) in the society.
Next, to examine ideological divisiveness, we find that the mean
within-group divisiveness is 0.87 (stdev = 0.47) for liberals and
0.90 (stdev = 0.43) for conservatives. Both of these within-group
divisiveness measures being less than 1, suggests that the likelihood
with which individuals within the same ideological group agree
about reporting an ad is higher than that when compared against
individuals across ideological groups.
Figure 6 (a, b) shows the distribution of the reporting across
ideological groups. We find significant differences in terms of the
reporting behavior across political ideologies. Defining a median
threshold for divisiveness, we find that in over 50 percent of the ads,
10Specifically, we asked “Some social media platforms allow you to report content by
clicking "report". Would you report this ad (e.g., Mark it as inappropriate or offensive)”
With answer choices “Yes”, “No”, “I don’t know”.
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Figure 6: Distribution of reporting across ideological groups.
(a) shows the distribution o proportion of the ads being re-
ported by either of political ideology, with x-axis containing
each of the high impact ads, (b) plots the between-group di-
visiveness for the high impact ads.
Reported by both liberals and conservatives
TAG YOUR PHOTOS WITH #TXagainst Send us the reason why don’t you want illegals in Texas. Comments, photos, and
videos are welcomed!
Counter-protest against ’White Power’ Confederate rally at Stone Mountain Not My Heritage
W. Wilson, 36, was found dead on Easter Weekend at the LAPD’s detention center in jail cell. According to ABC7 report, the
black woman, Wakiesha Wilson, had a disagreement with officers before she was found died. Wilson spoke to her lovely
family that v Black Woman Found Dead In Jail Cell After Arguing With Detention Officers I Black Matters Black Matters
Police are beyond out of control, help us make this viral! Follow our account in order to spread the truth!
Everything you wanted to know about Clinton’s dark side. Clinton FRAUDation
Reported predominantly by liberals.
Join us to learn more! Why aren’t white hoods and white supremacist propaganda illegal here in America?Why are Germans
ashamed of their bigotry, while America is proud of it? Black America( @black Blacklivessss
We simply can’t allow Muslims to wear burga, otherwise everybody who wants to commit a crime or terror attack would
wear this ugly rug and hide his or hers identity behing it. The risk is too highl Burga and other face covering cloth should
be banned from wearing in public!
Five police officers were killed in an organized attack during the protest in Dallas this Blue Lives Matter
Black intelligence is one of the most highly feared things in this country.
Parasite is an organism that lives in or on another organism and benefits by deriving nutrients at the host’s expense. About
20 million parasites live in the United States illegally. They exploit Americans and give nothing in return. Isn’t it time to get
rid of parasites that are destroying our country?
Reported predominantly by conservatives.
Come and march with us on 16 April. Stand with Baltimore. Let’s make change! Freddie Gray Anniversary March
Click Watch More to join us! Let’s fight against police brutality together! donotshoot.us Donotshoot.us Don’t Shoot
The USA is exactly the place where cops can’t care less about people’s civil rights. They are cynical toward the rule of law
and disrespectful of the rights of fellow citizens. Details: http://donotshoot.us/
We Muslims of the United States are subject to Islamophobia from the media where regularly STOP SCAPEGOATING MUS-
LIMS!
People, our race is in danger! Together we are an invincible power. Just say your word! Join us! Black Pride
Table 3: Example ads on the basis of reporting behavior by
the respondents from two political ideologies.
liberals and conservatives completely disagreed with each other (eg.
conservatives showed more than their median reported proportion
and liberals showed less than their median reported proportion,
and the vice versa). Table 3 shows a few examples of the ads which
showed the greatest differences in the reporting behavior by the
respondents of two political ideologies. These ads typically mention
politically-charged topics. For example, immigration — “TAG YOUR
PHOTOSWITH #TXagainst Send us the reason why don’t you want
illegals in Texas. Comments, photos, and videos are welcomed!” —
in this case, presenting a viewpoint associated with the Republican
Party, Or police brutality — “Police are beyond out of control, help
us make this viral! Follow our account in order to spread the truth!”
— in this case, presenting a viewpoint associatedwith the democratic
party.
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Figure 7: Distribution of the ads on approval and disap-
proval: (a&b) overall, (c&d) across ideological groups. (a&c)
plot the cumulative distribution functions (cdfs), (b&d) plot
the differences in approval in each ad, where x-axis consists
of all the ads.
3.2 Approving content of the ads
As another characterization of people’s reactions to the ads, we
asked respondents in a second survey whether they approve or
disapprove of a particular ad, and how strongly they approve or
disapprove.11 These questions in the survey were constructed based
on questions about political preference that have been extensively
pre-tested by Pew Research for previous surveys about political
polarization [6].We find that 87% of the addswere approved and 63%
of the adswere disapproved by at least 20% respondents (see Figure 7
(a)). To quantify the received responses, we assigned an approval
score on a 5 point scale with values of -2 (strong disapproval), -1
(weak disapproval), 0 (neither approve or disapprove), +1 (weak
approval), and +2 (strong approval). While computing the mean
approval score for a group, we dropped the 0 responses to ensure
that a mean approval score close to 0 corresponds to similar weights
from approval and disapproval. Table 4 lists some example ads along
with their approval tendencies by the two ideological groups within
our dataset.
Figures 7 (c&d) show the relationship between respondents’
ideology and approval of ad content. We observe that the mean
11Specifically, we asked “Do you approve or disapprove of what the ad says or im-
plies?” Answer choices: Approve; Disapprove; Neither; There is nothing in this ad
to approve or disapprove of; I don’t know. Followed by a measure of strength “Do
you [approve/disapprove] very strongly, or not so strongly?” if the prior question was
answered with approve or disapprove.
Approved by both the liberals and the conservatives
Show up, fight racism and take a stand for equality. Monday, May 2 at 4 PM at Erie County Holding Center Justice For
India: Not 1 More!
Alton Sterling, an innocent 37-year-old Black male, was outrageously executed by two Baton Justice For Alton Sterling
Did you see this? Damn... We lost count of how many mentally ill citizens were murdered during encounters with violent
cops. Here is another woman suffering from mental illness. Full story: http://bit.ly/10rglhk
Join Us! Support The Police!
Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that. Martin Luther
King, Jr.
Disapproved by both the liberals and the conservatives
No wonder white boys don’t get shot when they’re arrested’:
Anti-immigration is the only salvation!
O000ps seems like someone screwed up! Salute our brave and smart cops who mistake man’s member for a deadly weapon.
Follow US and stay WOKE!
It’s ok they’re women so they’ll only find the kitchen
This man beat up police officer who tased his wife. Do you agree with the man who defended his woman?
Approved by the liberals and disapproved by the conservatives
Two years have passed since August 11, 2014, the date. when 25-year-old Ezell Ford was mur Justice For Ezell Ford And
Donnell Thompson
We don’t want to honor racism, slavery and hatred. This is what Confederate Heritage is. Not My Heritage Rally
Say it loud: I’m black and I’m proud!
We Muslims of the United States are subject to Islamophobia from the media where regularly STOP SCAPEGOATING MUS-
LIMS!
Click to Learn More! Everybody knows that Islam is against terrorism but not everyone believes this fact! Islam does not
support terrorism under any circumstances. Terrorism goes against every principle in Islam. In fact if a Muslim engages in
terrorism, he is not following Islam and so he is not a Muslim! America, stop insulting peaceful citizens, stop taking all of
us as criminals, we don’t deserve such attitude! #muslimvoice #muslim @muslim Voice Musliminst
Approved by the conservatives and disapproved by the liberals
Heritage not hate y’all! Our flag has nothing to do with racism! The Federal Government shouldn’t be able to dictate what
we can and cannot do. Go follow Confederate page #1 on Instagram south united if you are proud of our southern heritage.
God bless Dixie! Confederate page #1 on Instagram! No racism, no hate! The south will rise again!
If we ever forget that we are One Nation Under God, then we will be a nation gone under. Ronald Reagan
Our country was drawing a blank for the last eight years. We need a strong leader who will March for Trump
America is at risk. To protect our country we need to secure the border.
Stop refugees! The’re taking our jobs!
Table 4: Example ads on the basis of the approval behavior
by the respondents from two political ideologies.
within-group divisiveness for liberals is 0.92 (stdev = 0.36) and 0.98
(stdev = 0.31) for conservatives (Table 2). Both the within-group
divisiveness values being lower than 1, suggests that the likelihood
with which individuals within the same ideological group would
agree about approving an ad is higher than that when compared
against individuals across ideological groups. The divisiveness in
approval responses is further confirmed by the between-group
divisiveness measure which ranges between 0 and 1 (mean = 0.34)
across the high impact ads.
3.3 Perceptions of false claims in the ads
To examine whether the high impact IRA ads contained any false
claims, in another survey we asked the respondents if they could
identify any false claims present in the ads.12 We find that 89%
(433 out of 485) of the high impact ads were identified to have
at least one false claim, and about 45% of the ads contained false
claims according to 10% of the respondents. Figure 8 (a) shows the
cumulative distribution of the ads with the number of respondents
who identified at least one false claim in them.
Next, as in the other two content analyses, we examined whether
respondents’ ideology related to their perception of the presence of
false claims (Figure 8). Both the within-group divisiveness values
being lower than 1, suggests that the likelihood with which individ-
uals within the same ideological group would agree about finding
false claim in an ad is higher than that when compared against
individuals across ideological groups. Table 5 shows a sample of
12Specifically, we asked respondents to “Please copy and paste any phrases or sentences
in the advertisement that you think contain a “factual claim”. That is, something that
someone could verify as True or False. If you cannot identify any claims, please type
“No Claims” in the first box.”We then asked them to label the phrases they had identified
as “True”, “False” or “not sure whether they are True or False”.
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False Claims identified by both liberals and conservatives
Bernie Sanders has proven himself to be the best candidate in every way. He is fair and strong and he is the only one fighting
for the black community. For more than 40 years he is advocating against any injustice and stays true to his moral values.
Vote for Bernie!
Illegal immigrants are not only flooding our country with drugs and sinking our economy, they are a major threat to Amer-
icas integrity. They don’t care about American laws, history and heritage. They just want our money and social benefits.
Considering the fact that they multiply like rabbits, soon we will all wear sombreros. We need to stop this invasion.
When you live in Texas you know that you are the chosen one!
It is time to wake up and see the truth. Cops are not our friends and government doesn’t care about you. Share this if you’re
awake!.
It’s ok they’re women so they’ll only find the kitchen
False claims identified by liberals.
Clinton said the United States needs to confront the ’systematic racism’ in its law enforcement efforts. We’re sick of politicians
organizing and leading the systematical propaganda against our police. It is unfair and vilely to accuse our heroes of every
sin and crime. In fact, the efficiency of our cops resulted in a decrease of the average amount of crimes, especially in large
cities. Law-abiding citizens should never fear cops, but criminals do. And that’s why Hillary is on the criminals’ side. Join
our rally on July, 23th in New York City, it’s time to show Clinton that we will never let her become our next President!
It might sound like a cliche but "get a job" is a really good advice for young liberals protesting against everything in the
world. Old man Ronald knew what he was talking about! Our college students should have an experience of paying taxes
before standing for illegal immigrants’ rights. They should rise their own children before standing for gay parenthood. It’s
no secret most active liberal’s supporters are people about 20-25 years- old while most conservatives are older. Well; as they
say; wisdom comes with ages.
His failed medical reform and unbelievable national debt is enough to put Obama behind bars. but that’s not all. His greatest
"accomplishment" is flooding America with countless criminals and giving them all an absolute omnipotence. Thanks to
Barack Hussein Obama we have at least one big terror attack each year; not to mention illegals raging out and poisoning
our country with drugs. For what he did to America Obama should rot in prison for the rest of his life.
Border Patrol agents in South Texas arrested an illegal alien from Honduras that had previously been deported and convicted
of Rape Second Degree. Thanks to Obama’s and Hillary’s policy, illegals come here because they wait for amnesty promised.
The wrong course had been chosen by the American government; but all those politicians are too far from the border to see
who actually sneaks through it illegally. Rapists, drug dealers, human traffickers; and others. The percent of innocent poor
families searching for a better life is too small to become an argument for amnesty and Texas warm welcome.
Anti-immigration is the only salvation!
False claims identified by conservatives.
Don’t Shoot is a community site where you can find recent videos about outrageous police misconduct, really valuable ones
but underrepresented by mass media. We provide you with first-hand stories and diverse videos. Join us! Click Learn more!
We don’t want to honor racism, slavery and hatred. This is what Confederate Heritage is. Not My Heritage Rally
The USA is exactly the place where cops can’t care less about people’s civil rights. They are cynical toward the rule of law
and disrespectful of the rights of fellow citizens. Details: http://donotshoot.us/
Police are beyond out of control, help us make this viral! Follow our account in order to spread the truth!
Join us to study your blackness and get the power from your roots. Stay woke and natural! Nefertiti’s Community
Table 5: Example ads on the basis of false claims identified
by the respondents from two political ideologies. Identified
false claims are highlighted in pink.
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Figure 8: Distribution of the ads on false claims (FCs): (a)
overall (as a cumulative density function), (b) across ideo-
logical groups (where each ad is plotted on the x-axis).
ads and false claims identified by respondents from each ideological
group (liberal, conservative).
3.4 Summary
This section focuses on peoples’ perceptions of the content of the
485 IRA ads we identified as high impact. To assess these percep-
tions along three axes – likelihood of being reported, approval
and disapproval, and the presence of false claims – we conducted
Figure 9: Top 20 attributes based on the number of advertise-
ments they appeared.
three U.S. census-representative surveys. Our analysis of the per-
ceptions queried in these surveys shows that ideological opinions
of individuals influence their perceptions of these ads. We find that
many of these ads were severely divisive, and generated strongly
varied opinions across the two ideological groups of liberals and
conservatives (see Figure 6, 7, 8).
4 ANALYZING THE TARGETING FORMULA
Next, we focus on understanding how the target formula is created
by advertisers and the role that Facebook interface plays on that.
4.1 Targeting Possibilities
The Facebook ads platform provides three approaches for advertis-
ers to target people [3, 23], briefly described next.
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) targeting is the form in
which advertisers provide personal information about users such
as name, phone number, and email address so that Facebook can
directly place the ads to them. This kind of targeting does not appear
in the IRA dataset.
Look-alike audience target. For this targeting option, advertisers
provide to Facebook a list of users similar to that one in the PII
or a list of people who liked the advertiser Facebook page. Then,
Facebook attempt to target a similar audience to the group in this
specific list. Only 1.1% of the high impact ads used this option.
Attribute-based targeting allows the advertiser to create a target
formula based on a wide range of elements that include user ba-
sic demographics (i.e. gender, age, location, language), advanced
demographics (i.e. political leaning, income level, ‘Parents with
children preschoolers’), interests (i.e. newspapers, religion, politics),
and behaviors (i.e. ‘Business Travelers’ or ‘New Vehicle buyers’).
Recent work showed that the number of possible interests provide
by Facebook is greater than 240,000 [23]. Facebook allows one to
include or exclude users with each of those attributes and combine
multiple attributes as part of a target formula. The vast majority of
the high impact ads, 895 out of the 905, used this option to elaborate
a formula. We found that 78% of the ads used 2 or more interests
and behaviors in their formula, creating very complex formulas
with up to 39 distinct attributes.
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Figure 10: Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) for the
number of suggestions.
Figure 9 shows the top attributes that appear in the ads target
formula based on the number of times they appeared in different ads.
There were 497 distinct attributes and the most present attributes
interest were African-American history and African-American Civil
Rights Movement (1954-68), appearing in 295 (32%) ads. We can
note a prevalence of attributes related to African-American and
Hispanic Population, with interests like Mexico, ‘Hispanidad’ and
‘Latin hip hop’. Next, we investigate aspects of the Facebook ads
platform design that might have favored the IRA ads to massively
explore this particular targeting strategy.
4.2 The Role of Attribute Suggestions
Facebook provides a tool for advertisers that, given a target attribute,
it presents a list of other attributes that target people with similar
demographic aspects [23]. For example, in the list of suggested
targeting interests for ‘Townhall.com’, a page with an audience
in which 79.5% of the users are very conservative users according
to Facebook, there are other pages with similar bias towards very
conservative users, i.e. ‘The Daily Caller’ (67.1%), ‘RedState’ (84.3%),
and ‘TheBlaze’ (59.6%) [20].
In order to investigate if the IRA ads have used suggestions to
elaborate complex targeting formulas, we crawled the attribute
suggestions for each attribute that appear in the dataset of highly
impact ads. Figure 10 shows the cumulative distribution function for
the number of suggested attributes that appear in the same formula.
We can see that around 64% of the ads that potentially used this
feature because they have at least three target attributes suggested
by Facebook as part of the same formula. There are 1.2% of ads
with more than 10 suggested attributes in the same formula. As an
example, all the 13 interests, including Islam, Ramadan, Islamism,
used in the target formula of the ad ID 191513 appear as suggestions
for at least one of the others in the formula. For ad ID 184014, we
were able to find 9 out of 10 of the interests using the interest
suggestion feature. This provides evidence that this feature may
have been a key element used by the IRA campaign to choose the
target audience.
13http://www.socially-divisive-ads.dcc.ufmg.br/app.php?query=1915
14http://www.socially-divisive-ads.dcc.ufmg.br/app.php?query=1840
4.3 Summary
In this Section we show that the vast majority of the IRA ads use
attribute-based targeting, containing complex target formula that
includes interest and behavioral attributes that are likely suggested
by Facebook. Next, we investigate the extent to which these formu-
las allowed advertisers to reach demographic biased audiences.
5 ANALYZING THE TARGET AUDIENCE
We start by describing our methodology to reproduce the IRA
queries (without running the ad) and gather the demographics
of the of the targeted users.
5.1 Assessing the Audience Demographics
Before launching an advertisement in Facebook, the advertiser can
get the estimated audience (i.e., the number of monthly active users)
likely to match the target formula. Our methodology consists of
using the Facebook Marketing API15 to reproduce the targeting
formula of all high impact IRA ads and get the demographics of
the population that matches each targeting formula, without run-
ning any ad. This methodology has been extensively used recently
for different purposes, including inferring news outlets political
leaning [20], study migration [26] and gender bias [13] across coun-
tries, and for public health awareness [21] and lifestyle disease
surveillance [5]. For our analysis, we considered seven demographic
categories: political leaning, race, gender, education level, income,
location (in terms of states), and age. As a baseline for comparison,
we also gathered the demographic distribution of the United States
Facebook population.
Only 11% of the used attributes that appear in the IRA ads tar-
geting formulas are not available for targeting anymore due to
changes in the Facebook Marketing API. In most of these cases,
we reproduced the ad target formula without the missing attribute,
especially when the attribute looks redundant with the others in
the formula. We did not reproduce only 6 targeting formulas.
5.2 Measuring Audience Bias
To assess the audience bias of each of the demographic aspects that
we considered, we computed the differences between the fraction
of the population with a demographic aspect and the same fraction
of the population in the baseline distribution (i.e. the U.S. Facebook
population), namely the bias score. For instance, if the percentage
of African-Americans in the audience of a particular ad is 40%, the
bias score for this dimension in the ad is 0.25 as the percentage of
African-American in the U.S. Facebook population is nearly 15.5%
(0.4 − 0.155).
Figure 11 depicts the distribution of themeasured bias on political
leaning and ethnic affinity. In comparison with all the demographic
categories, these two showed to be the ones with the highest biases.
We note that most of the ads target audiences that are more biased
towards the African-Americans population and the Liberals. More
specifically, about 70% of the IRA ads target an audience with a
higher proportion of African-Americans than in the US Facebook
distribution. This difference is even accentuated for Liberals, with
82% more biased in comparison with the reference distribution. The
15developers.facebook.com/docs/marketing-apis
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Figure 11: Bias in demographic dimensions. Each violin rep-
resents the bias score for all high impact ads in a particu-
lar demographic dimension. Themedian is represented by a
white dot in the center line of the violin. 50% of the data is
present between the two thick lines around the center
Group Report Approval False Claims
Liberals -0.17*** 0.41*** -
Conservatives -0.15*** 0.32*** -
Table 6: Pearson’s r correlation between targeting and the
ideological divisiveness for the high impact ads (*** p <
0.001, no statistical significance in the case of false claims).
percentage of ads with bias score superior to 0.15 is 52% for African-
American and 41% for Liberals. Our dataset suggests the presence of
those ads that target extremely biased populations of conservatives,
Liberals, Hispanic, and especially African-Americans. The target
audiences for the IRA ads are slightly biased towards women and
young adults (18-34 years), which are omitted from Figure 11 due
to space constraints.
5.3 Targeting audience and Divisiveness
Next, we investigate if the advertisers target the ads towards audi-
ences that are less likely to identify their inappropriateness due to
their ideological perception bias. Additionally, we examine if the
ads directed to biased audiences could leverage the already existing
societal divisiveness to further amplify it among the masses.
To understand these nuances of targeted advertising, in this sec-
tion, we focus on the relationship between the targeted population
and the ideological divisiveness in reporting, approval, and false
claim identifying behaviors for the ads. Table 6 reports the correla-
tion values between the targeted population and the tendency of
the population to report, approve, and identify false claims.
Reporting. We observe a negative correlation in the case of
reporting for both Liberals and Conservatives (also see Figure 12 (a)).
This suggests that the targeted population has a lower tendency to
report than the non-targeted one. This is also evident per Figure 12
(b), where we find that the reporting by the targeted population
carries way lower likelihood than the reporting by the overall (or
non-targeted) population.
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Figure 12: Relationship between targeting and the responses
by ideological groups. (a,c,e) show the proportion of popu-
lation targeted and their tendency of response. Each circle
represents an ad, and their size is proportionate with the be-
tween group disputability for that ad. (b,d,f) compares the
mean responses of the targeted ads with their hypotheti-
cal non-targeted counterpart (i.e., overall responses), where
each ad is represented on the x-axis
Approval. We observe a positive correlation in the case of ap-
proval for both Liberals and Conservatives (also see Figure 12 (c)).
This suggests that the targeted population has a greater tendency to
approve the ads as compared to the non-targeted population. This
is also evident per Figure 12 (d), where we find that the approval
score by the targeted population carries greater score for a majority
of the ads compared to the overall (or non-targeted) population.
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False claims. For false claims, we do not find any significant
correlation between the targeted population and divisiveness. How-
ever, per Figure 12 (e&f) we do find that the targeted population
has a lower tendency to identify false claims.
Taken together, we can assume that the ads were “well-targeted”
in a way towards that population which was more likely to believe,
and approve and subsequently less likely to report or identify false
claims in them.
5.4 Summary
Our findings show that the IRA ads reached audiences that are very
biased towards African-Americans and Liberals. More important,
we show that ads were overall targeted towards a population that
is more likely to believe, and approve and subsequently less likely
to report or identify false claims in them.
6 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
In this paper, we provide an in-depth quantitative and qualitative
characterization of the Russia-linked ad campaigns on Facebook.
Our findings suggest that the Facebook ads platform can be abused
by a new form of attack, that is the use of targeted advertising to
create social discord. These ads showed to be divisive, were 10 times
more effective than a typical Facebook ad, were biased especially in
terms of race and political leaning, and tended to be targeting more
the users who are less likely to identify their inappropriateness. We
also provide strong evidence that these advertisers have explored
the Facebook suggestions tool to engineer the targeted populations.
While this tool may be helpful in many ways, it needs to be
carefully redesigned to avoid that a malicious advertiser reaches so
easily groups of vulnerable people. For example, Facebook recently
presented its intention to manually inspect ads before they are
launched [1], aiming to guarantee that ads do not divide or discrim-
inate people. Our work suggests that the priority of the candidates
to be manually inspected can be based on their targeting formula.
For instance, those ads that target extremely narrowed populations,
on the basis of race, political leaning, and other sensitive topics
have greater likelihood of being divisive. Additionally, the ads that
experience severely high click-through rates could also be flagged
to be quickly inspected.
As a final contribution, we have deployed a system (available at
http://www.socially-divisive-ads.dcc.ufmg.br/ ) that displays the ads
and their computed information such as the demographics of their
targeting audiences.
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